Abstract
Introduction
So far, automated verification of cryptographic protocols in models in the style of Dolev and Yao [28] has been considered under a variety of angles: (un)decidability results [29, 37] , practical decision procedures [48, 66, 5] , extension to security properties other than secrecy and authentication (e.g., [15] ), to protocols requiring equational theories, to soundness with respect to computational models (e.g., [42] for the latter two points), in particular.
We consider yet another angle: producing formally checkable proofs of security, automatically. There is indeed a more and more pressing need from the industrial community, as well as from national defense authorities, to get not just Boolean answers (secure/possibly insecure), but also formal proofs, which could be checked by one of the established tools, e.g., Isabelle [53] or Coq [8] . This is required in Common Criteria certification of computer products at the highest assurance level, EAL 7 [38] , a requirement that is becoming more and more common for security products. For example, the PFC initiative ("trusted platform") of the French pôle de compétitivité System@tic will include a formal security model and formal proofs for its trusted Linuxbased PC platform. Producing formal proofs for tools such as Isabelle or Coq is also interesting because of their small trusted base, and defense agencies such as the French DGA would appreciate being able to extract formal Coq proofs from Blanchet's ProVerif tool [11] .
It is certainly the case that hand-crafted formal proofs (e.g., [13, 54] ) provide such formally checkable certificates. Isabelle's high degree of automation helps in this respect, but can we hope for full automation as in ProVerif, and having formal proofs as well? It is the purpose of this paper to give a first answer to that question.
Outline. We explore related work in Section 2, then describe our security model,à la Dolev-Yao, in Section 3. We really start in Section 4, where we show that our problem reduces to a form of model-checking, which is unfortunately undecidable in general. To solve this, we turn to finite models, expanding on Selinger's pioneering idea [60] . We observe that representing finite models explicitly is sometimes cumbersome, and that such models are sometimes hard to find. Surprisingly, larger, finite models in the form of alternating tree automata are sometimes easier to find: we examine such models in Section 6. We then show how we can model-check clause sets against both kinds of models in Section 7. Finally, we argue that the approach is equally applicable to some security protocols that require equational theories in Section 8, and we conclude in Section 9. Our claims are supported by several practical case studies.tree automata [48] , set constraints [5] , typing [1] , or process algebra [4, 3] , one may fairly say that most of these frameworks embed into first-order logic. It is well-known that tree automata are subsumed by set constraints, and that set constraints correspond to specific decidable classes of firstorder logic (a fact first observed by Bachmair, Ganzinger, and Waldmann [7] ). Some modern typing systems for secrecy are equivalent to a first-order logic presentation [2] , while safety properties of cryptographic protocols (weak secrecy, authentication) presented as processes in a process algebra are naturally translated to first-order logic [2] , or even to decidable classes of first-order logic such as H 1 [51] .
In all cases, the fragments of first-order logic we need can be presented as sets of Horn clauses. Fix a first-order signature, which we shall leave implicit. Terms are denoted s, t, u, v, . . . , predicate symbols P , Q, . . . , variables X, Y , Z, . . . We assume there are finitely many predicate symbols. Horn clauses C are of the form H ⇐ B where the head H is either an atom or ⊥, and the body B is a finite set A 1 , . . . , A n of atoms. If B is empty (n = 0), then C = H is a fact. For simplicity, we assume that all predicate symbols are unary, so that all atoms can be written P (t). This is innocuous, as k-ary relations P (t 1 , . . . , t k ) can be faithfully encoded as P (c(t 1 , . . . , t k )) for some k-ary function symbol c; we shall occasionally take the liberty of using some k-ary predicates, for convenience. We assume basic familiarity with notions of free variables, substitutions σ, unification, models, Herbrand models, satisfiability and first-order resolution [6] . It is well-known that satisfiability of firstorder formulae, and even of sets of Horn clauses, is undecidable. We shall also use the fact that any satisfiable set S of Horn clauses has a least Herbrand model. This can be defined as the least fixpoint lfp T S of the monotone operator T S (I) = {Aσ | A ⇐ A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ S, Aσ ground, A 1 σ ∈ I, . . . , A n σ ∈ I}. If ⊥ ∈ lfp T S , then S is unsatisfiable. Otherwise, S is satisfiable, and lfp T S is a set of ground atoms, which happens to be the least Herbrand model of S.
We shall concentrate on reachability properties (i.e., weak secrecy) in this paper, without equational theories for the most part. While this may seem unambitious, remember that our goal is not to verify cryptographic protocols but to extract formally checkable proofs automatically, and one of our points is that this is substantially harder than mere verification. We shall deal with equational theories in Section 8, and claim that producing formally checkable proofs is not much harder than in the non-equational case. We will not deal with strong secrecy, although this reduces to reachability, up to some abstraction [12] . Weak and strong secrecy are, in fact, close notions under reasonable assumptions [25] .
We also concentrate on security proofs in logical models, derived from the Dolev-Yao model [28] . Proofs in computational models would probably be more relevant. E.g., naive Dolev-Yao models may be computationally unsound [47] . However, some recent results show that symbolic (DolevYao) security implies computational security in a number of frameworks, usually provided there are no key cycles at least, and modulo properly chosen equational theories on the symbolic side. See e.g. [39] , or [62] . The latter is a rare example of a framework for developing formal proofs (e.g., in Coq or Isabelle) of computational soundness theorems. The search for such theorems is hardly automated for now; yet, we consider this to be out of the scope of this paper, and concentrate on Dolev-Yao-like models.
The starting point of this paper is Selinger's fine paper [60] . Selinger observes that security proofs (in first-order formulations of weak secrecy in Dolev-Yao-like models) are models, in the sense of first-order logic. To be a bit more precise, a protocol π encoded as a set of first-order Horn clauses S is secure if and only if S is consistent, i.e., there is no proof of false ⊥ from S. One may say this in a provocative way [33] by stating that a proof of security for π is the absence of a proof for (the negation of) S. Extracting a formal Coq proof from such an absence may then seem tricky. However, first-order logic is complete, so if S is consistent, it must be satisfiable, that is, it must have a model. Selinger then observed that you could prove π secure by exhibiting a model for S, and demonstrated this by building a small, finite model (5 elements) for the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol [49, 45] .
The idea of proving properties by showing the consistency of a given formula F , i.e, showing that ¬F has no proof, is known as proof by consistency [40] , or inductionless induction [44, 19] . Note that the formal Coq proofs we shall extract from models of S, using our tool h1mc, are proofs of security for π that work by (explicit) induction over term structure. The relationship between inductionless and explicit induction was elicited by Comon and Nieuwenhuis [21] , in the case of first-order logic with equality and induction along the recursive path ordering.
We shall use an approach based on model-checking certain classes of first-order formulae F against certain classes of finite models M, i.e., on testing whether M |= F . There is an extensive body of literature pertaining to this topic, see e.g. the survey by Dawar [26] . One particular (easy) result we shall recall is that model-checking first-order formulae against finite models, even of size 2, is PSPACEcomplete. Many results in this domain have focused on fixed-parameter tractability, and to be specific, on whether model-checking was hard with respect to the size of the model, given a fixed formula as parameter. Even then, the parametrized model-checking problem is AW[ * ]-complete, and already W[k]-hard for Π k formulae. This will be of almost no concern to us, as our formulae F will grow in general faster than our models.
None of the works cited above addresses the question of extracting a model from a failed proof attempt. Tammet worked on this for resolution proofs [64] . The next step, producing formally checked, inductive proofs from models, seems new. In one of our approaches, finite models will be presented in the form of tree automata, and formally checking models in this case essentially amounts to producing formal proofs of computations on tree automata. This was pioneered by Rival and the author [57] ; the procedure of Section 7 is several orders of magnitude more efficient.
A Simple Protocol Model,à la Dolev-Yao
Our first-order model for protocols is close to Blanchet's [10] , to Selinger's [60] , and to a number of other works. While the actual model is not of paramount importance for now, we need one to illustrate our ideas. Also, models in the style presented here will behave nicely in later sections.
Blanchet uses a single predicate att, so that att(M ) if and only if M is known to the Dolev-Yao attacker. We shall instead use a family of predicates att i , where i is a phase, to be able to model key and nonce corruption (more below). The facts that the Dolev-Yao attacker can encrypt, decrypt, build lists, read off any element from a list, compute successors and predecessors are axiomatized by the Horn clauses of Figure 1 . We take the usual Prolog convention that identifiers starting with capital letters such as M , K, A, B, X, are variables, while uncapitalized identifiers such as sym, crypt, att are constants, function or predicate symbols. We assume crypt(M, K) denotes the result of symmetric or asymmetric encrypting M with key K, and write it {M } K for convenience. The key k(sym, X) is the symmetric key used in session X; the term session i (A, B, N a ) will denote any session between principals A and B sharing the nonce N a , while in phase i; we shall also use k(sym, [A, S]) to denote long-term symmetric keys between agents A and S. The key k(pub, X) denotes agent X's long-term public key, while k(prv, X) is X's private key. Lists are built using nil and cons; we use the ML notation
: . . . :: M n :: nil. We use suc to denote the successor function λn ∈ N · n + 1, as used in our running example, the Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol [49] .
This protocol, whose purpose is to establish a fresh, secret session key K ab between two agents, Alice (A) and Bob (B), using a trusted third party (S), is shown in Figure 2 . It has the convenient property that there is a wellknown attack against it, so that the key K ab that Bob will end up having is possibly known to the attacker, while the keys K ab that S sent and that Alice received will remain secret. Note that all three keys K ab may be different.
The protocol itself is modeled in a simple way, originally inspired from strand spaces [65] , and similarly to Blanchet Figure 1 . Intruder capabilities Figure  2 . The Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key protocol [10] . Each agent's role is modeled as a sequence of (receive, send) pairs. Given any such pair (M 1 , M 2 ), we add a Horn clause of the form att i (M 2 ) ⇐ att i (M 1 ). This denotes the fact that the attacker may use the agent's role to his profit by sending a message M 1 of a form that the agent will accept, and learning M 2 from the agent's response. Accordingly, the protocol rules for the NeedhamSchroeder symmetric key protocol are shown in Figure 3 . We use Blanchet's trick of abstracting nonces by function symbols applied to the free parameters of the session, so that na i (A, B) denotes N a , depending on the identities A and B of Alice and Bob respectively and the phase i, and nb i (K ab , A, B) denotes N b , depending on the phase i, the received key K ab , and identities A and B (all three being variables, by our convention). In clause (15) , representing the fact that Alice receives {N b } K ab (message 4 of Figure 2 ) to send {N b +1} K ab (message 5), we use an auxiliary predicate alice key i to recover Alice's version of K ab , received in message 2. We also define a predicate bob key i in (17) to recover Bob's version of K ab after message 5.
The fact that variables such as A, B are used throughout for agent identities, instead of actual agent identities (for which we reserve the constants a, b, s, and i for the attacker), is due to the fact that we wish to model unboundedly many sessions of the protocol in parallel. E.g., (11) 
where 
Figure 5. Phases
states that any pair of agents A, B may initiate the protocol and emit message 1 of Figure 2 . We assume that the only possible agents are Alice (a), Bob (b), the trusted thirdparty (s), and the Dolev-Yao attacker i. Since we only deal with secrecy, considering this many agents is sufficient [22] . To model the fact that secrets may be corrupted over time, we distinguish two phases i = 1, 2. Intuitively, phase 1 represents sessions that are old enough that the old session keys k(sym, session 1 (A, B, N a) ) may have been guessed or discovered by the intruder. This is (again) a conservative approximation: we estimate that all old secrets (in phase 1) are compromised, although only some or even none of them may have been actually compromised. On the other hand, no secret in phase 2 is compromised-unless the protocol itself leaks them. To model phases, we only need a few more clauses, shown in Figure 5 : (18) states that the intruder has memory, and remembers all old messages from phase 1 in phase 2, while the other clauses state that all old session keys, as well as all old nonces, are compromised. This is similar, e.g., to Paulson's Oops moves [54] . Figure 6 lists our security assumptions, i.e., what we estimate the attacker might know initially: all agent identities are known, as well as all public keys k(pub, X), and the attacker's own private key k(prv, i)-whatever the phase.
Figure 6. The attacker's initial knowledge
Note that talking about public and private keys in this protocol, which only uses symmetric keys, is overkill. We include them to illustrate the fact that the model is not limited to symmetric key encryption, and public-key protocols would be encoded just as easily.
Finally, Figure 7 lists our security goals, or rather their negated forms. Note that we are only concerned with the security of phase 2 data, since phase 1 is compromised by nature. Negation comes from the fact that a formula G is a consequence of a set S of clauses such as those listed above if and only if S, ¬G is inconsistent. E.g., (22) is the negation of ∃N a · att 2 (k(sym, session 2 (a, b, N a ))), and corresponds to asking whether the secret key K as , as generated by the trusted third-party in current sessions, can be inferred by the attacker. (23) asks whether there is a key K ab that would be both known to the attacker, and is plausibly accepted by Alice (a) as its new symmetric key; we again use the auxiliary predicate alice key 2 . Finally, (24) asks whether there is a key K ab as could be used in the final check of the protocol by Bob (message 5 of Figure 2 ), and that would be, in fact, compromised.
Figure 7. (Negated) security goals
Call, somewhat abusively, the protocol π the collection of the cryptographic protocol itself, the (Dolev-Yao) secu-rity model, the security assumptions and the security goals. The clause set S NS denoting the symmetric-key NeedhamSchroeder protocol is then the union of the clauses in Fig Unsurprisingly, running a first-order prover against S NS reveals a possible attack against Bob. E.g., SPASS v2.0 [68] finds that the above set of clauses is inconsistent, with a small resolution proof, where only 309 clauses were derived, in 0.07 seconds on a 2.4 GHz Intel Centrino Duo class machine. Examining the proof reveals that the attack is actual. This is the well-known attack where the attacker uses an old message 3 from a previous session (for which K ab is now known), and replays it to Bob. The attacker can then decrypt message 4, since he knows K ab , and Bob will accept message 5 as confirmation.
Removing the failing security goal (24) produces a consistent set of clauses S saf e NS : so there is no attack on the other two security goals. This seems to be out of reach for SPASS (at least without any specific option): after 10 minutes already, SPASS is lost considering terms with 233 nested applications of the successor function suc; we decided to stop SPASS after 4h 10 min, where this number had increased to 817. However, our own tool h1, from the h1 tool suite [32] , shows both that there is a plausible attack against Bob and definitely no attack against Alice or the trusted third-party, in 0.68 s; h1 works by first applying a canonical abstraction to the given clause set S [34, Proposition 3], producing an approximation S in the decidable class H 1 [51, 66] ; then h1 decides S by the terminating resolution algorithm of [34] . We shall return to this approach in Section 6.
Undecidability
An intuitive idea to reach our goal, i.e., producing formal proofs from a security proof discovered by a tool such as ProVerif, SPASS or h1, is to instrument it so as to return a trace of its proof activity, which we could then convert to a formal proof. However, this cannot be done. As illustrated on S saf e NS , the protocol, without the security goal (24) , is secure because we cannot derive any fact of the form att 2 (k(sym, session 2 (a, b, n a ))) for any term n a , and there is no term k ab such that both att 2 (k ab ) and alice key 2 (a, k ab ) would be derivable. In short, security is demonstrated through the absence of a proof.
It would certainly be pointless to instrument ProVerif, SPASS or h1 so as to document everything it didn't do. However, these tools all work by saturating the input clause set S representing the protocol π to get a final clause set S ∞ , using some form of the resolution rule, and up to specific redundancy elimination rules. To produce a formally checkable security proof of the protocol π-in case no contradiction is derived from S-, what we can therefore safely assume is: (A) S ∞ is consistent, (B) S ∞ is entailed by S, and (C) S ∞ is saturated up to redundancy (see [6] ).
Bruno Blanchet kindly reminded me that point (C) could in principle be used to produce a formal proof that π is secure. We have to: (a) prove formally that the saturation procedure is complete, in the sense that whenever S ∞ is saturated up to redundancy, and every clause in S is redundant relative to S ∞ , then S is consistent; and: (b) produce a formal proof that S ∞ is indeed saturated up to redundancy. Task (b) is complex, and complexity increases with the sophistication of the saturation strategy; realize that even the mundane task of showing, in Isabelle or Coq, that two given literals do not unify requires some effort. Moreover, S ∞ is in general rather large, and task (b) will likely produce long proofs. Task (a) is rather formidable in itself. Furthermore, (a) and (b) have to be redone for each different saturation procedure, i.e., for different tools, or when these tools evolve to include new redundancy elimination rules or variants of the original resolution rule.
This prompts us to use only points (A) and (B) above, not (C). Fortunately, and this is one of the points that Selinger makes [60] , a clause set is consistent if and only if it has a model. We may therefore look for models of S as witnesses of security for π. While Selinger proposes this approach to check whether π is secure, it can certainly be used to fulfill our purpose: assume that we know that S is consistent, typically because ProVerif, SPASS or h1, has terminated on a clause set S ∞ that is saturated under some complete set of logical rules (forms of resolution in the cited provers) and which does not contain the empty clause ⊥; then our tasks reduces to answering two questions: (1) how can we extract a model from a saturated set of clauses S ∞ not containing ⊥? (2) given a model M that acts as a certificate of satisfiability, hence as a certificate of security for π, how do we convert M to a formal Coq proof?
Question (2) is not too hard, at least in principle: build a model-checking algorithm to check whether M satisfies S (in notation, M |= S), and keep a trace of the computation of the model-checker. Then convert this trace into a formal proof. We shall see how to do this in Section 7.
Question (1) is easy, but ill-posed, because we did not impose any restriction on the format the model should assume. (Note that we don't know whether M is finite, in particular in the cases of SPASS and ProVerif.) The answer is that S ∞ is itself a perfectly valid description of a model, namely the unique least Herbrand model lfp T S ∞ of S ∞ (I owe this simple remark to Andreas Podelski, personal communication, 1999). What this model lacks, at least, is being effective: there is in general no way of testing whether a given ground atom A holds or not in this model. In our case, the important result is the following, which shows that we cannot in general even test whether M |= S, where M = lfp T S ∞ , contradicting our goal (2). 
is the only clause of S 1 with head ⊥, there is a ground in-
, since the T S 1 operator is Scott-continuous. By an easy induction on n (which, intuitively, is proof length), every atom of the form
is in the least Herbrand model of S ∞ , i.e., the latter satisfies S. Conversely, if lfp T S ∞ satisfies S, that is, q( * ), by similar arguments we show that it must satisfy some instance p(goal σ), which is then in lfp T S 1 , so that S 1 is unsatisfiable.
Despite the similarity, this theorem is not a direct consequence of Marcinkowski and Pacholski's result [46] , that the Horn clause implication problem C 1 |= C 2 is undecidable. Recall that C 1 |= C 2 whenever every model of C 1 satisfies C 2 . Indeed, this is not equivalent to (not entailed by, to be precise) the fact that the least Herbrand model of
Replacing the ground unit clause q( * ) of S above by att 1 ( * ) shows that: Figure 1) , and the number of security goals is zero.
Corollary 4.2 The following problem is undecidable: given a satisfiable set of first-order Horn clauses S ∞ , check whether lfp T S ∞ is a model of a first-order formulation of a cryptographic protocol π. This holds even if π contains absolutely no message exchange (i.e., the number of protocol steps is zero), has only one phase, the initial knowledge of the intruder consists of just one ground message * , the Dolev-Yao intruder has no deduction capability at all (i.e., we don't include any of the rules of
To mitigate this seemingly devastating result, recall that SPASS and ProVerif use variants of resolution, and the clause sets S ∞ produced by SPASS or ProVerif are saturated up to redundancy. SPASS uses sophisticated forms of ordered resolution with selection and sorts, while ProVerif uses two restrictions of resolution. "Saturated up to redundancy" [6] means that every conclusion of the chosen resolution rule with premises in S ∞ is either already in S ∞ , or redundant with respect to S ∞ , e.g., subsumed by some clause in S ∞ . It is well-known that, for all variants of resolution that can be shown complete by Bachmair and Ganzinger's forcing technique [6] , the models of a set S ∞ that is saturated up to redundancy are exactly the models of the subset S prod ⊆ S ∞ of all the so-called productive clauses of S ∞ . In particular, for Horn clauses, lfp S prod = lfp S ∞ . For example, the first phase of the ProVerif algorithm uses a form of resolution with selection, where all literals of the form att i (M ) are selected in clause bodies. The effect is that the clauses of S prod cannot contain any literal of the form att i (M ) in their body. It is then a trivial observation that Proposition 4.1 still holds with S ∞ replaced by S prod (just make p different from att i ). However, this first phase is not a complete procedure in itself. Ordered resolution with selection [6] , as well as the kind of resolution used in SPASS [67] are complete. Using the former for example, S prod consists of clauses where no atom is selected in any clause body, and the head is maximal with respect to the chosen stable, well-founded ordering . Even so, this does not help in general: 
Explicit, Finite Models
There is a much simpler solution: directly find finite models M of the set S of clauses representing the protocol π. This won't enable us to verify protocols that are secure because S is satisfiable, but not finitely satisfiable. But again Selinger's early experiments [60] suggest that this is perhaps not a problem in practice. To wit, remember that there is a 5 element model for Selinger's encoding of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol. In fact, our encoding of the 7-message Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol has a 4 element model, found by K. Claessen's tool Paradox. As for our running example, our tool h1 finds a 46 element model for S saf e NS (see Section 3), but there is also a 4 element model (see below).
There are certainly protocols which could only be shown secure using techniques requiring infinite models. In particular, this is likely for parametric verification of recur- [43] . Examples of such protocols are Bull and Otway's recursive authentication protocol [14] , or the IKA protocols [63] . Note however that both are flawed [59, 56] , so that S would in fact be unsatisfiable in each case.
Finding finite models of first-order clause sets is a sport, and is in particular addressed in the finite model category of the CASC competition at annual CADE conferences. Paradox [16] Paradox represents such finite models in the obvious way, as tables representing the semantics of functions, and truth-tables representing predicates. Call these explicitly presented models. The explicitly presented model found by Paradox on S saf e NS has 4 element !1, !2, 3, and !4. All identities a, b, i, s have value !1; this is also the value of nil, prv and pub, while the value of sym is !2. The att 1 predicate holds of value !1 only, while att 2 holds of !1 and !2 only. The table for encryption is shown in Figure 8 : !3 and !4 can be thought as values that will remain secret, but encrypting !4 with the compromised datum !2 will produce !2, which is known to the attacker in phase 2.
Model-checking clause sets S against such small models M, represented as tables, i.e., checking whether M |= S, is straightforward, and works in polynomial time, assuming the number of free variables in each clause of S is bounded: let k be the largest number of free variables in clauses of S, n the number of elements in M, then for each clause C in S, enumerate the at most n k tuples ρ of values for the variables of C, then check that C under ρ is true. Call one such step of verification that C holds under ρ a check. However, the assumption that the number of free variables is bounded is important in the latter paragraph. In general, using the same construction that the one showing that model-checking first-order formulae against finite models is PSPACE-complete, we obtain: Proof. We show that checking M |= S is NP-complete. Membership in NP is easy: guess an unsatisfied clause C in S and values for its free variables. Conversely, we show that the problem is NP-hard already when M is the two-element model {0, 1}, with one predicate true, which holds of 1 but not of 0. We also assume term constants t (denoting 1), f (denoting 0), and (denoting logical conjunction), or (denoting logical disjunction), not (denoting negation). We are now ready to reduce SAT: let the input be a set S 0 of propositional clauses on a vector A of propositional variables, seen as a
conjunction F ( A). Build a firstorder term F * ( A), where now the variables in A are seen as term variables, by replacing ands (∧) by and, ors (∨) by or, negations (¬) by not, and so on, in F ( A). Let S consist of the unique positive unit clause true(not(F * ( A))). Clearly M |= S if and only if S 0 is not satisfiable.
What this lemma illustrates, and what practice confirms, is that it is not so much the number k of elements of the model that counts, or even the number of entries in its tables, but what we called the number of checks needed. Both the number of entries in the tables and the number of checks can be exponentially large. We have conducted a small experiment on secrecy protocols found in the Spore library [61] -be warned that the proportion of secrecy protocols that are in fact secure is small-, see Figure 9 . The NS row is our example S saf e NS , while the amended NS row is a corrected version [50] that satisfies all required security properties. Paradox always finds smallest possible models, since it looks for models of size k for increasing values of k. On the other hand, h1 is a resolution prover that decides the class H 1 , all of whose satisfiable formulae have finite models; the models extracted are in particular not minimal in any way. We report figures found by h1 so as to appreciate how even small models in terms of number of elements (e.g., 57 for the amended NS protocol) are in fact large in practice (e.g., 188 724 entries-we actually report a number of transitions in a deterministic tree automaton describing the model, as explained in Section 6, and this is a lower bound on the actual number of entries), and require many checks (e.g.. more than one billion). The NSL row is the 7-message version of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, checking that the secrecy of the exchanged mes- Figure 9 . Model sizes sages is preserved, instead of mutual authentication. This is a rare example where the standard approximation strategy of h1 fails (without added tricks), and h1 does not conclude that the protocol is safe; Paradox finds a 4 element model, showing it is indeed safe. The Yahalom row is Paulson's corrected version of the Yahalom protocol [55] . While it is found secure by h1 in 4.8 s, the model found (in implicit form, see Section 6) is so big that we have been unable to convert it to an explicit representation in 2 GB of main memory using our determinizer pldet. Paradox finds a 4 element model for NS in 1.6 s, a 4 element model for NSL in 4.85 s, a 6 element model for Yahalom in 53 min, and hasn't found one for amended NS in 8 hours 1/4; the only thing we know is that the least model contains at least 5 elements.
From an explicitly presented finite model M, it is in principle easy to extract a formally checkable proof. In Coq, we declare an inductive type of values of M, e.g.,
M for a 4-element model. Then, define all function and predicate symbols by their semantics. E.g., crypt (Figure 8) would be described by:
and att Proofs of clauses C from the clause set S would then be very short: if C contains k free variables, we would write its proof in Coq's tactic language as intro x 1 ; case x 1 ; . . . intro x k ; case x k ; simpl; tauto. The effect of this command line is to enumerate all n k assignments of values to variables. This not only takes time proportional to the number of checks (the #checks columns in Figure 9 ), but also produces a proof term of size proportional to it.
We conclude that the explicitly presented models approach would only work for small models. While this approach is applicable for the 4 to 6 element models that Paradox found in Figure 9 , it is completely unrealistic for the models found by h1, whether representable explicitly (NS, amended NS) or not (Yahalom). Note that the MACE algorithm underlying Paradox is doubly exponential in the number n of elements of the model. In practice, the largest models we have discovered with Paradox contained 7 elements. However, when this works, this works well, despite Lemma 5.1. The Coq proofs corresponding to NS, NSL, and Yahalom are 748, resp. 1 038, resp. 3 581 lines long, and are checked by Coq in 3.29 s, 1.76 s, and 36.6 s respectively.
Large Models, and Tree Automata
There are several reasons why we would like to find a more efficient method for producing formally checkable proofs. This will be solved in Section 7. As it stands, the strategy of Section 5 does not scale up. That is, it does not apply to security proofs that would require finite models larger than 6 elements. And there are a few reasons why we would like some larger finite models.
The first one is that Dolev-Yao secrecy properties are in fact simple to prove. Remember that the 4-element model that Paradox found for S saf e NS mapped each intruder identity to the same value, !1. No such model can ever be used to prove authentication properties, where we need to make a distinction between identities. This phenomenon is already illustrated on Paulson's corrected version of the Yahalom protocol [55] , whose security depends on checking the identity of an agent included in a message.
A second reason is that the style of protocol specification that we used in Section 3 makes it more likely that secure protocols have small models, but we may need other styles in other applications. One may describe our style as stateless: agents only remember past values, not because we have modeled a local state containing all values of their internal variables, but because they are given back to them in received messages. For example, look at message 2 of Figure Figure 3) , where Alice expects a message of the form
. While freshness is checked by verifying that the nonce part N a is of the form na i (. . .), Blanchet's clever trick of parametrizing na i by some free parameters forces this term to match only if A was indeed the intended recipient (viz. the occurrence of A in the key k(sym, [A, s])), and to remember who A wanted to talk to (viz. the two occurrences of B must match). Other, more precise, protocol verification tools employ stateful models, whereby each agent maintains a state vector consisting of its local program counter, and all values of its variables (see [13] for an early example). This is needed in ver-ifying protocols where sessions must be sequential, e.g., for the Otway-Rees protocol [52] , which is secure if sessions are sequential, but insecure if sessions can be run in parallel [17] . We have played with such a model, and found it satisfiable both with h1 (with a 54 element model, in 1.1 s) and with Paradox (with a 4 element model, in 227 s). However, the fact that state vectors have high arity (up to 9) entails that, while function tables only require 143 entries-for the 4 element model-, predicate entries require 706 716.
We can only expect to need even larger models when considering composition of protocols, or Web services [9] , or cryptographic APIs [24] , in order of increased complexity.
Our model-checking technique will be able to check the larger models found by h1 (see Figure 9) . Some of it rests on intuitions on how we decide H 1 by resolution [34] , and the relationship to tree automata.
For each satisfiable set S of Horn clauses, and each predicate symbol P , let L P (S) be the set of ground terms t such that P (t) is in the least Herbrand model of S. L P (S) is the language recognized at state P . When S consists only of tree automaton clauses P (f (X 1 , . . . , X n )) ⇐ P 1 (X 1 ), . . . , P n (X n ) (X 1 , . . . , X n pairwise distinct), this coincides with the usual definition of the set of terms recognized at P ; such clauses are just tree automaton transitions from P 1 , . . . , P n to P . Accordingly, we shall call a set of tree automaton clauses a (tree) automaton. This connection between tree automata and Horn clauses was pioneered by Frühwirth et al. [30] ; there, L P (S) is called the success set for P . This connection was then used in a number of papers: see the comprehensive textbook [20] , in particular Section 7.6 on tree automata as sets of Horn clauses.
Tree automata clauses can be generalized right away to alternating tree automata [20, Chapter 7] . Call -block any finite set of atoms of the form P 1 (X), . . . , P m (X) (with the same X, and m ≥ 0); it is non-empty iff m ≥ 1. We abbreviate -blocks as B(X) to make the variable X explicit. We shall also write B for the set {P 1 , . . . , P m }. Alternating automaton clauses are of the form:
where B 1 (X 1 ), . . . , B k (X k ) are -blocks, and X 1 , . . . , X k are pairwise distinct. Universal clauses are of the form P (X). An alternating tree automaton is any set S of alternating automaton clauses and universal clauses. (The standard definition [20] does not include universal clauses; on a fixed first-order signature Σ, a universal clause P (X) may be replaced by the clauses P (f (X 1 , . . . , X k )) ⇐ P (X 1 ), . . . , P (X k ), where f ranges over Σ.) Automata are the special case without universal clauses, and where -blocks contain at most one atom.
Given any clause set S, h1 first applies a canonical abstraction [34, Proposition 3] to get a clause set S in the decidable class H 1 [51, 66] , and such that S is satisfiable whenever S is. Then h1 saturates S by ordered resolution with selection [34] , getting a saturated set S ∞ . The point is that the subset S prod ⊆ S ∞ of productive clauses that h1 returns is always an alternating tree automaton [34, Proposition 9] . Determinizing S prod can be done by a standard powerset construction, and we have implemented this in the tool pldet, also a part of the h1 tool suite [32] . The states of the determinized automaton Det(S prod ) are sets of states of S prod , i.e., sets of predicate symbols.
We shall assume that the following procedure is used to define Det(S prod ), which builds new states on demand. Initially, the set Q of states, and the set of transitions of Det(S prod ), are empty. Then, while there is a function symbol f , say of arity k, and k states
. Call this the powerset construction. It is well-known that the powerset construction has the property that the language L q (Det(S prod )) of the state
The connection with finite models was done by Kozen [41] , who observed that complete deterministic tree automata were just finite models. (In fact, Kozen defined them this way.) There is a transition from the tuple of states (q 1 , . . . , q m ) to q labeled f , i.e., a clause q(f (X 1 , . . . , X m )) ⇐ q 1 (X 1 ), . . . , q m (X m ) in the clausal representation of the automaton, if and only if the semantics of f maps the tuple of values (q 1 , . . . , q m ) to q. That is, the states of a complete deterministic automaton are the values of the corresponding finite model. The powerset construction is easier to understand in this light: for every f satisfying ( †) above, instead of adding the transition
we add the table entry f (q 1 , . . . , q k ) = q to the model. Additionally, tables for predicates are given as truth-tables; for each predicate P , this is defined in Det(S prod ) so that P holds of state q if and only if P ∈ q.
We can now explain how we estimated the size of models returned by h1 in Figure 9 : we ran pldet, which builds Det(S prod ), and we counted states (values) and transitions (table entries) .
Finally, while our model-checking technique will work on alternating tree automata, it will in particular work on finite models encoded as alternating tree automata (which will necessarily be deterministic); i.e., each entry in a table, stating that f applied to values (v 1 , . . . , v m ) should yield value v, will give rise to a tree automaton clause
where there is one is v predicate for each value v; the truthtable of each predicate P is encoded as the collection of clauses P (X) ⇐ is v(X), where v ranges over the values that satisfy P in the model. While this won't decrease the size of the description of the model in Coq-still proportional to #entries-, our model-checker will have the opportunity to find proofs that are shorter than the #checks steps needed in enumeration proofs. E.g., our model-checker will produce the obvious proof that P (X) ⇐ P (X) holds (in any model), without enumerating all possible values for X.
Finally, we loop the loop and observe that modelchecking against Det(S prod ) or against our old friend lfp T S prod are the same thing: Lemma 6.1 Let S prod be an alternating tree automaton.
For any set S of first-order clauses, Det(S prod ) |= S if and only if lfp T S prod |= S.
Proof. Say that a value v in a model M is definable iff v is the denotation of some ground term. A model is fully complete if and only if all its values are definable. Clearly, lfp T S prod is fully complete, as every value is its own denotation. Det(S prod ) is also fully complete, since every value (state) q in Det(S prod ) is the denotation of any ground term in L q (Det(S prod )), and this is non-empty by construction.
For any ground term t, observe that Det(S prod ) |= P (t) if and only if t is in
, where the latter equality is by standard set reasoning. That is, Det(S prod ) |= P (t) if and only if lfp T S prod |= P (t). It follows that Det(S prod ) |= F if and only if lfp T S prod |= F for every universal closed formula F : this is by structural induction on F , using the easy fact that, whenever M is fully complete, M |= ∀X · G(X) if and only if M |= G(t) for every ground term t. Since every set S of first-order clauses is a universal sentence (taking into the implicit universal quantifications over free variables), we conclude.
Model-Checking Against Alternating Tree Automata
Since Det(S prod ) can have exponential size in the size of S prod , one may say that alternating tree automata are compact representations of possibly large finite models. We describe how to model-check S against M = Det(S prod ) efficiently in practice. But compactness has its toll: Proposition 7.1 Checking whether M |= S, where M = Det(S prod ) is compactly represented by an alternating tree automaton S prod , and S is a set of Horn clauses, is EXPTIME-complete. It is EXPTIME-hard already if Proof. Let n be the number of predicates in S prod , S, k be the largest number of variables in a clause C of S, α the largest symbol arity. Note that we don't require to compute Det(S prod ). However, computing it yields the desired upper bound: Det(S prod ) can be computed in time exponential in the size of S prod , producing a model with at most 2 n states, and tables with at most 2 nα entries. We then enumerate up to (2 n ) k = 2 nk tuples ρ of values for variables. For each, we can check whether C holds under ρ in exponential time on a Turing machine (we need exponential time to travel along exponential-sized tables stored on the tapes).
Conversely, non-deterministic tree automaton universality is EXPTIME-complete [20, Section 1.7, Theorem 14] . This is the problem of checking whether, given a (non-alternating) tree automaton S prod and a state P , L P (S prod ) is the set of all ground terms. This is the same as checking lfp T S prod |= S, where S only contains the clause P (X), hence to Det(S prod ) |= S by Lemma 6.1.
To define our model-checking procedure ( Figure 10, Figure 11) , we need a few definitions. Let S prod be an alternating tree automaton. Call a predicate P universal in S prod if and only if S prod contains the clause P (X). Judgments Γ C are composed of a clause C and a history Γ, which is a finite set of -clauses. An -clause, E(X) is a disjunction of literals of the form P (X) or ¬P (X), with the same variable X; -blocks are the special case with no negation. All clauses in a judgment are implicitly universally quantified, and do not share variables. Here it is convenient that clauses may be non-Horn, and are written as disjunctions
We let S prod /P be the the set of clauses of the form P (f (X 1 , . . . , X n )) ⇐ B in S prod for some body B and some function symbol f ; S prod /P, f is the set of clauses of the same form, this time with given function f . We write t for t 1 , . . . , t n , and X similarly in the name of brevity; [ t/ X] is the substitution [t 1 /X 1 , . . . , t n /X n ]. The notation E(f ( X)), used in rule (−P Elim), stands for E(X)[f ( X)/X]; this rule is the only one that adds a clause to the history Γ. The brace notation used there means that there are as many premises as there are clauses P (f ( X)) ∨ D in S prod /P ; similarly for (−P, f Elim). In rule (+P, f Elim), we enumerate the clauses P (f ( X)) ⇐ B of S prod /P, f ; B denotes the conjunction of all atoms in the body B. By cnf, we mean a conjunctive normal form, obtained by distributing ands over ors. The (Split) rule is the only non-deterministic rule, and picks one subclause C i of C 1 ∨ . . . ∨ C n , provided the latter is block-decomposed, i.e., C 1 , . . . , C n are all non-empty and share no free variable. The rules in Figure 11 apply only if no rule from Figure 10 applies. This implies that no universal predicate occurs on the right of .
where To produce a Coq proof that Det(S prod ) |= S, we check that C for each clause C in S. Our tool h1mc, also part of the h1 tool suite [32] , looks for a proof of C by applying the model-checking rules from the bottom up. The important result here is the following soundness theorem. This is proved by induction on a derivation of C; apart from this outer induction, the rest of the proof is the skeleton of the Coq proof that h1mc extracts from . Let denote the proper subterm ordering, and observe this is well-founded. Let be defined by s t if and only if s t or s = t. 
Theorem 7.2 (Soundness)
Let Γ = ∀X · E 1 (X), . . . , ∀X · E m (X), and C = C(X 1 , . . . , X k ) be∀X 1 , . . . , X k · 1≤i≤k 1≤j≤m (∀X X i ·E j (X)) ⇒ C(X 1 , . . . , X k )
Proof.
By induction over a derivation of the judgment. We look at the last rule. The cases of (−Univ) and (+Univ) are clear. For (Loop), we observe that C must be of the form E j (X i ) for some i, j, and we conclude by the antecedent ∀X X i · E j (X).
For (−P Elim), let X 1 , . . . , X k contain at least the variable X free in E(X) ∨ ¬P (X). Without loss of generality, let X be X 1 . We prove
by an auxiliary induction on X 1 , well-ordered by . (In Coq, we use the fix tactic to do this.) Our new induction hypothesis is ( * ) ∀X ≺ X 1 · E(X) ∨ ¬P (X). We must then show that E(X 1 ) ∨ ¬P (X 1 ) holds in lfp T S prod . Assume P (X 1 ) holds: we must show E(X 1 ). But the only way that P (t) can hold in lfp T S prod , for any ground term t, is that t is of the form f ( t), and that there is a clause with head P (f ( X)), say P (f ( X)) ⇒ B, in S prod /P , where B[ t/ X] holds in lfp T S prod . (In Coq, we use case and inversion.) We may also write this clause as P (f ( X))∨D, where D is equivalent to the negation of B. Let X be X k+1 , . . . , X k+p , and let E m+1 (X) be E(X) ∨ ¬P (X). By the outer induction on , we have a proof of
we have that every X X k+i is such that X ≺ X 1 , so we may apply ( * ). Simple logic then shows that E(X 2 )
Rule (−P, f Elim) is justified by the same case analysis, using Coq's case and inversion tactics, but does not require to introduce any new induction hypothesis into the history. The correctness of (Split) is obvious. Finally, for (+P, f Elim), propositional reasoning (using Coq's tauto tactic) shows that
Using the fact that, for
Using Theorem 7.2 and Lemma 6.1, we then obtain: Corollary 7.3 If C is derivable using the model-checking rules for every C ∈ S, then Det(S prod ) |= S.
For the sake of efficiency, h1mc actually uses a number of extra rules that act as shortcuts in common cases. Typically, proving Γ P (X) ⇐ Q(X), i.e., proving that L Q (S prod ) ⊆ L P (S prod ), can be done in many cases by exhibiting a form of simulation relation between automaton states such that Q simulates P . This is folklore in model-checking circles. Another h1-specific optimization is the following. Remember that h1 first abstracts the initial clause set S into another clause set S that falls into the class H 1 . Instead of model-checking S directly against Det(S prod ), we model-check S instead, then produce a Coq proof that S implies S. Since S is obtained from S by some reversed form of resolution, showing that S implies S is particularly easy.
Finally, h1mc memoizes proof attempts. That is, when attempting to derive Γ C, it first checks whether it has already derived Γ C for some Γ ⊆ Γ and some clause C that subsumes C, i.e., such that C = C σ ∨ D for some substitution σ and some subclause D. If so, it reuses the proof of Γ C to infer Γ C directly.
The model-checking procedure is also complete, in a subtle sense. We now need to quantify over all signatures Σ that contain all the symbols of S prod and S. While lfp T S prod is a set of ground atoms that is independent of the signature Σ, as a model, it is a subset of the set of all ground atoms, which does depend on Σ. To make the dependency on Σ explicit, write this model lfp Σ T S prod . Then: We omit the proof, for lack of space. In any case, this is less central to our work. In any case, neither soundness nor completeness has to be part of our trusted base: the onus of correctness rests entirely on Coq itself.
Since h1, as a resolution engine, produces proof that are independent on Σ, any set S prod produced by h1 from S will be such that not only lf pT S prod |= S, but the stronger assumption of Proposition 7.4 is satisfied. Models produced by Paradox only satisfy lfp Σ T S prod |= S for Σ equal to-no larger than-the signature Σ 0 defined by S. To regain completeness under this weaker assumption, we need an additional rule:
whenever E(X) is an -block consisting only of positive atoms +P (X), and there is one premise for each function symbol f in the given signature Σ 0 . This is costly: the only rule that can be applied to derive the premise is (+P, f Elim), which we had better avoid. We have experimented h1mc with the (+Elim) rule on (i.e., using its socalled -exact-sig option), and found this not to be competitive relative to the simple-minded approach of Section 5 on models found by Paradox, despite extra algorithmic optimizations in h1mc in this case. This seems to be due to the fact that tables are dense, and that h1mc still has to enumerate them in some way. (E.g., we have witnessed h1mc generate 510 premises in one instance of (−P Elim).)
On the other hand, the approach of Figure 10 and Figure 11, Figure 12 . Coq proofs cases where we can find a model using h1. We believe this is due to the fact that transitions in alternating tree automata found by h1 are very sparse, so that, in particular, instances of (−P Elim) have very few premises in general. The role of optimizations (see below) is crucial, too. Figure 12 gives an indication of the size of Coq proofs produced by h1mc on the models found by h1. We have copied back the #elts, #entries and #checks from Figure 9 for easy reference. Times (rightmost column) are reported as t 1 + t 2 , where t 1 is the time taken by h1mc, and t 2 is the time taken by Coq to check the proof. Note that producing and checking a formal Coq proof of the amended NS protocol, even on the 57 element model found by h1, is practical, even though there is probably a smaller modelwhich we didn't find. It is also rather remarkable that while we haven't been able to determinize S prod in the Yahalom case, h1mc manages to find a proof in a reasonable amount of time.
Equational Theories
More and more protocols in the literature can only be modeled using equational theories, to represent e.g. bitwise exclusive-or or modular exponentiation [23] . While h1 really cannot deal with such equational theories, this is in principle easy to Paradox: just add the needed equations as unit clauses. For example, Figure 13 lists axioms for modular exponentiation as used in Diffie-Hellman key agreement, where exponents obey an Abelian group law * ; g(M ) is meant to denote g M for a fixed generator g. We were happily surprised to see that this approach worked fine. (In particular, that secure protocols found in the literature again tend to have models with few elements.) We started with the small Diffie-Hellman protocol (A → B : g N a , B → A : g N b , followed by some message exchange A → B : {1} g N a * N b ), again with old compromised sessions, and more recent sessions. Paradox finds that the common key g N a * N b of current sessions is unknown to the intruder in 0.34 s, producing a 3 element model (namely Z/3Z) with 100 entries.
For a more complicated example, we modeled Gong's protocol [31] , or rather the variant from the SPORE repository [61] . This is shown in Figure 14 , and uses an operator ⊕ (exclusive-or) that is associative, commutative, has a unit 0 and is nilpotent (M ⊕ M = 0). Here f 1 , Figure 14 . Gong's protocol, from SPORE f 2 , f 3 , g are one-way functions, P a is a long-term secret shared between A and S, and similarly for P b . We omit the clauses, which again include two phases separated by an Oops move revealing all session keys from the first phase. Using Paradox, we have been able to verify that the session key K = f 1 (N s , N a , B, P a ) remained secret in current sessions, from the point of view of Alice, Bob and the trusted third-party: Paradox finds a 4 element model in two hours, with 1 774 table entries.
It is easy to extend the approach of Section 5 to the equational case. Indeed, to model-check the clause set S against the finite model M, modulo the equational theory E, we only need to model-check S ∪ E ∪ Eq against M, where E is the set of clauses equal(M, N ) when M = N ranges over the equations of E, and Eq is the theory of equality: for each function symbol f of arity k, a clause equal(f (X 1 , . . . , X k ), f(Y 1 , . . . , Y k )) ⇐ equal (X 1 , Y 1 ) , . . . , equal(X k , Y k ), for each predicate symbol P , a clause P (X) ⇐ P (Y ), equal(X, Y ), and finally the clauses equal(X, X), equal(X, Y ) ⇐ equal(Y, X) and equal(X, Z) ⇐ equal(X, Y ), equal(Y, Z). This is easily done. Note that this contrasts with handling equality in automated theorem proving, which can make proof search harder (e.g., H 1 plus equality is undecidable [34, Theorem 11] ). But checking them against a finite model is no harder than in the non-equational case. Using the approach of Section 5, we have produced a 641 line Coq proof of the Diffie-Hellman protocol this way, which is checked in 0.74 s, and a 2 555 line Coq proof of Gong's protocol, which is checked in 1 204 s (20 minutes).
Conclusion
We hope to have demonstrated, first, that producing formally checkable proofs from first-order formulations S of security goals π was difficult, and sometimes more difficult than verification itself. The most frustrating aspect of things is that there seems to be no practically usable way of exploiting the fact that ProVerif, SPASS or h1 concluded that there was no attack, to infer a proof of it.
On the other hand, we hope to have shown that formal Coq proofs of security could be extracted and checked efficiently from a model (in the explicit model approach of Section 5), or from a model-checking process (in the automatatheoretic approach of Section 7).
This endeavor is a first step towards formally verifying full security protocols, and many things remain to be done. For one, complementing this work with formally checkable proofs of computational soundness of the Dolev-Yao model, when it is indeed sound [39, 62] , would be desirable. There is a growing interest from industrial firms and defense agencies towards formally checked proofs of security models, and we believe our work solves an important part of it.
Another necessary step is to find techniques that would scale up better. While Paradox and the explicit model approach of Section 5 work fine when there is a model of at most, say, 6 elements, the automata-theoretic approach of Section 7 handles much larger models, but cannot cope with equational theories yet. However, note that the number of elements of a model is a very bad measure of its size: function and predicate tables are much larger than what the number of elements suggests. We have also observed that the size of the model is independent of the size of the protocol to be proved secure. Rather, the size of the model seems to be correlated to its logical complexity. In particular, we have observed, reproducing an experiment by Koen Claessen, that some safe C implementations of roles in the Needham-Schroeder asymmetric key protocol [35] only required models with 3 elements. It remains to be examined whether scaling up is necessary, or is in fact a non-problem.
